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Waste Law and the Value of Food  
Carrie Bradshaw* 
   
Abstract Ð This article explores the role of law in an emerging consensus as to the 
causes of food waste: a structural failure to value food. Food wasteÕs legal home is 
waste law. The sagacity of this siting would appear to be self-evident. If there is a 
body of law concerned with the problem of waste generally, then why not use that 
body of law to address the challenges of a particular waste stream? We should test 
this assumption, acknowledging foodÕs importance and difference as a resource, 
and keeping in mind structural causes of food waste.  This article explores the 
limitations of waste law through an imbalance in support for anaerobic digestion 
over redistribution; an imbalance which actively removes edible food from the food 
supply chain. By underpinning and validating this imbalance, waste law reflects 
and reinforces structural causes of food waste, rather than providing the analytical 
tools needed to address the problem. 
Keywords: food waste; waste law; anaerobic digestion; food redistribution; 
renewables subsidies; sustainability criteria  
 
1. Introduction 
                                               
  This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Environmental Law following peer review.  The definitive publisher-authenticated version [ÔWaste Law 
and the Value of FoodÕ (2018) 30(2) Journal of Environmental Law 311-331] is available online at 
https://academic.oup.com/jel/article-abstract/30/2/311/4990344. 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Leeds (formerly of the University of York) | c.j.bradshaw@leeds.ac.uk 
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Food waste is an urgent, global public policy issue, with environmental, economic and 
social implications.1  The UK wastes 15 million tonnes of food waste every year, 9 million 
tonnes of which is avoidable or preventable, and could have been eaten.2  To the extent 
that this reflects a failure to value food, this is clearly perverse.  A dominant narrative in 
political and cultural discourse blames feckless consumers for these levels of food waste.3  
There is some truth in this: households throw away almost half of the UKÕs annual food 
waste.4  However, this is not the entire story, not least because more than half of the UKÕs 
food waste occurs elsewhere in the supply chain.  Furthermore, households are not 
singularly responsible for all the food they waste. Recent scholarship highlights how food 
waste often arises from a collection of factors which are essentially structural, and beyond 
any one actorÕs own control.5  Food waste is thus argued to be not a problem of feckless 
consumerism at the household level, but a side effect of a deeply embedded failure to 
value food at a structural (rather than individual) level. 
 This article explores the role of law in that structural failure to value food. Many 
legal areas impinge on food wasteÑfrom food safety to labelling, tort to tax, competition 
law to contractÑbut the legal home for food waste is waste law.  The sagacity of this 
siting would appear to be self-evident. If there is a body of law concerned with the 
problem of waste generally, then why not use that body of existing legal principles to 
                                               
1 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Food Waste in England (HC 2016-17, 429) 5. 
2 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Food Security: Demand, Consumption and Waste (HC 
2014-15 703) 15. 
3 David Evans, ÔBlaming the Consumer Ð Once Again: The Social and Material Contexts of Everyday Food 
Waste Practices in Some English HouseholdsÕ (2011) 21 Critical Public Health 429. 
4 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1) 9. 
5 David Evans, Food Waste: Home Consumption, Material Culture and Everyday Life (Bloomsbury 
Academic 2014); Catherine Alexander, Nicky Gregson and Zsuzsa Gille, ÔFood WasteÕ in Anne Murcott, 
Warren Belasco and Peter Jackson (eds), The Handbook of Food Research (Bloomsbury Academic 2013); 
David Evans, Hugh Campbell and Anne Murcott (eds), Waste Matters (1st edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2013); 
Zsuzsa Gille, ÔFrom Risk to Waste: Global Food Waste RegimesÕ (2012) 60 The Sociological Review 27.  
See also Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 
1984). 
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address the challenges of a particular waste stream?  The contention made here is that this 
assumption should be tested. We should query what analytical work the core legal 
concepts do with respect to food, acknowledging in the process foodÕs special status as a 
resource, and keeping in mind structural accounts of food waste. The article explores 
waste lawÕs limitations through its role in framing, underpinning and validating an 
imbalance in support for anaerobic digestion (AD) over food redistribution. Support for 
AD, combined with a dearth of measures to support food redistribution, incentivises the 
removal of edible food from the food supply chain. Far from being a Ôpositive solutionÕ 
to the problem of food waste, this is a failure to value food with unacknowledged 
distributional consequences.   
 This is partially a story familiar within waste law: the limited utility of the waste 
hierarchy, together with an over-inclusive definition of waste, both of which fail to 
mediate tensions between waste management (what we do with stuff once it becomes 
waste) and waste prevention (preventing stuff from becoming waste in the first place).  
However, whilst food waste tells us about difficulties within waste law, these difficulties 
are exacerbated by foodÕs importance and difference as a resource. Of course, dismantling 
that broader structural failure is more than a narrow doctrinal challenge regarding waste 
lawÕs application to food, or legal lines drawn between edible food surplus and inedible 
food waste. However, waste law is reflective and reinforcing of structural failures to value 
food, adding to the problem of food waste rather than providing the tools to address it. 
With waste lawÕs central architecture shaping forthcoming EU legislation on food waste, 
and with the UK perceived as a world leader on food waste interventions (particularly in 
the US),6 this article serves additionally as a caution to other jurisdictions. 
                                               
6 Jonathan Bloom, American Wasteland: How America Throws Away Nearly Half of Its Food (Da Capo 
Lifelong Books 2011) ch 11, ÔGreat, Britain! A Kingdom United in Hating WasteÕ. 
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 The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the role of food law in 
drawing legal lines around the value of food. Section 3 outlines the AD/redistribution 
imbalance. Section 4 explores the limitations of waste law applied to food through its role 
in validating and underpinning the AD/redistribution imbalance, in turn reflecting and 
reinforcing problematic conceptions as to the value of food. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Food Law and Edibility: Drawing Lines Around the Value of Food 
The legal home for food waste is waste law. This is partly because food law is largely 
unconcerned with food waste, both in its stated purposes (free movement of food and 
consumer safety) and as an academic subject.7  Instead, waste law frames and underpins 
food waste interventions, and forthcoming EU legislation concerning food waste is 
housed primarily within the Waste Framework Directive (WFD).8 However, 
understanding how waste law applies to food requires an understanding of foodÕs argued 
special status as a resource, together with its perishability.  As highlighted in the literature 
(and will be explained below), the (i) ÔimportanceÕ and (ii) ÔdifferenceÕ of food has 
implications for its wastage. While food law is largely unconcerned with managing food 
as a resource, this section argues that food law does nonetheless shape the line between 
                                               
7 Regulation 178/2002/EC of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety 
[2002] OJ L31/1, art 5(1); Terry Marsden and others, The New Regulation and Governance of Food: Beyond 
the Food Crisis? (Routledge 2009); Caoimhn MacMaolin, Food Law: European, Domestic and 
International Frameworks (Hart Publishing 2015). Neither of the cited academic works devotes time to 
food waste, even in more obvious places: eg food waste is conspicuous by its absence in MacMaolinÕs 
coverage of food safety, date labeling and climate change (ibid 5Ð6 & 259Ð63).  This is not a criticism, but 
indicative of food waste being largely outwith food law.  Food waste sometimes features within policy 
debates on sustainable food and food security: Environmental Audit Committee, Sustainable Food (HC 
2010-12 879) 26Ð8; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 2) ch 4. 
8 EU Commission, ÔProposal for a Directive Amending Directive 2008/98/EC on WasteÕ (2015) 
COM(2015) 595 final, 2 December 2015; HM Government, ÔPrevention Is Better than Cure: The Role of 
Waste Prevention in Moving to a More Resource Efficient EconomyÕ (Crown Copyright 2013). Although 
the latter was written by a previous government, it is the current Waste Prevention Programme for England, 
as required under Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 November 2008 on waste [2008] OJ L312/3, art 29. 
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edible and inedible food in ways that are conceptually appropriate (albeit imperfectly 
drawn) in view of foodÕs importance and difference as a resource. This line drawing 
pursuant to food law, together with associated allocations of responsibility and benefits, 
serves as a point of comparison for our later exploration of waste lawÕs application to 
food. 
 Food has importance as a resource given its intrinsic use value for humanity as one 
of the few basic human needs.  Commentators and policy makers routinely acknowledge 
the particular perversity (even immorality) of wasting food, especially alongside world 
hunger.9  In order to respect the importance of food to humanity, and to Ôvalue food as 
foodÕ, we should aim to keep food in the food supply chain by distributing any surplus 
food for human consumption.10 Of course, food has many values beyond its intrinsic use 
value. Food is a commodity, so that it also has an exchange value.11  Food also serves 
social and cultural roles, so that food is often consumed for purposes beyond sustenance, 
and can be akin to a material good.12 Furthermore, not all food is of equal calorific value, 
and nor is all food produced equal; beef, for example, is especially resource-intensive.13  
Nonetheless, food has a profoundÑif not uniqueÑimportance to humanity, in addition 
only perhaps to water, and, as explained, this importance colours the scholarship.   
 The legal definition of food pursuant to food law acknowledges foodÕs purpose in 
providing human sustenance: food is Ôany substance or product intended to be, or 
                                               
9 Around 795m people globally are undernourished, FAO, IFAD and WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in 
the World 2015: Meeting the 2015 International Hunger Targets: Taking Stock of Uneven Progress (FAO 
2015) 4; Evans (n 5) 60Ð1; Bloom (n 6) 41Ð58. 
10 Food surplus can also be fed to animals, keeping food within the supply chain indirectly. Note that EU 
law imposes strict controls on this: EU Committee, Counting the Cost of Food Waste: EU Food Waste 
Prevention (HL 2013-14 154) 39Ð40. 
11 Carrie Bradshaw, ÔThe Environmental Business Case and Unenlightened Shareholder ValueÕ (2013) 33 
Legal Studies 141; Peter Jackson and the CONANX group, Food Words - Essays in Culinary Culture 
(Bloomsbury Academic 2015) 240Ð1. 
12 Marsden and others (n 7) 13. 
13 Tristram Stuart, Waste: Uncovering the Global Food Scandal (Penguin 2009). 
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reasonably expected to be ingested by humansÕ.14  This distinguishes food from animal 
feed or fuel (although note that the controversial production of food-capable resources 
for feed or fuel is beyond the scope of this paper, which is concerned with wasting ÔfoodÕ: 
matter intended for human consumption).  Food law also prohibits the sale and donation 
of ÔunsafeÕ food; that is, food which is Ôinjurious to healthÕ or Ôunfit for human 
consumptionÕ.15  When food is unsafe, it is an offence to sell or donate it.16  Prohibitions 
on the supply of unsafe ÔfoodÕ comprise part of the legal contours of ÔedibilityÕ, and a 
legal line as to the value of food.  
 Food is different from many (though not all) resources in that it is matter subject to 
decay, and this, as with the importance of food, is also emphasised in food waste 
scholarship.17  Whilst some food is shelf-stable for years, some food is perishable, so that 
food (together with its intrinsic use value to humanity) has a shorter life span compared 
with many resources.18 Food waste thus arises not Ôsolely as a consequence of human 
activityÕ.19  Perishable surplus food is also more difficult to keep in the supply chain,20 
and food is less likely than other commodity flows to be reused or redistributed.21   
 Food law acknowledges foodÕs perishability.  EU law requires most pre-packed 
food to include either a date of expiration (a Ôuse byÕ date), concerned with food safety, 
or a date of minimum durability (a Ôbest beforeÕ date), concerned with food quality.22  Use 
                                               
14 General Food Law (n 7), art 2. 
15 ibid, art 14; Food Safety Act 1990 (as amended), ss 1 and 2. 
16 Food Safety Act 1990, s 8; General Food Regulations 2004/3279, reg 4. 
17 Julian Parfitt, Mark Barthel and Sarah MacNaughton, ÔFood Waste within Food Supply Chains: 
Quantification and Potential for Change to 2050Õ (2010) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London B: Biological Sciences 3065. 
18 Evans (n 5) 60Ð6. 
19 ibid 67. 
20 Catherine Alexander and Chris Smaje, ÔSurplus Retail Food Redistribution: An Analysis of a Third Sector 
ModelÕ (2008) 52 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 1290. 
21 See Evans (n 5) 65Ð7 explaining how food runs counter to studies showing the effective workings of 
alternative conduits of discarding, such as redistribution, because of the process of physical decay. 
22 Regulation 1169/2011/EU of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers [2011] 
OJ L304/18 2011, art 9(1). 
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by dates are for highly perishable foods likely after a short period of time to constitute an 
immediate danger to human health.23 Food passed its use by date is ÔunsafeÕ, so that 
selling or donating such food constitutes an offence.24 Best before dates are for lower-risk 
foods; it is lawful to sell and donate food passed its best before date, which is safe to 
consume if stored appropriately. 
 These aspects of food law have been implicated in driving levels of food waste. For 
example, some argue that food safety liability is a barrier to redistributing edible surplus 
food, either because actors in the supply chain poorly understand the regime, or its 
implementation is over-cautious when set against the aims of redistributing food and 
reducing waste.25  Meanwhile, others argue that consumers confuse best before dates with 
use by dates,26 or even that best before dates, as an indicator of quality not safety, are 
unnecessary for certain foods.27 These issues are beyond the scope of this articleÕs primary 
concern with waste law. However, they do raise broader points that are thematically 
relevant to this articleÕs concern with regulating food waste in response to its structural 
causes, the significance of food-related legal line drawing, and the appropriate legal home 
for food waste. 
 First, food law polices what is a conceptually appropriate, if albeit imperfectly 
drawn, legal line as to when food is of value as food.  ÔUnsafeÕ food, or food past its use 
by date, is not suitable for human consumption.  Food law is thus a legitimate constraint 
                                               
23 ibid, art 24. 
24 ibid, art 24; Food Safety Act 1990, s 8; General Food Regulations 2004/3279 (n 16), reg 4; Food Safety 
and Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/2996, reg 19(1).  
25 See Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1); EU Committee (n 10); Caoimhn 
MacMaolin, ÔSecuring Safety, Controlling Crises: Development and Misapplication of Food LawÕ in 
Antonis Antoniadis, Robert Schtze and Eleanor Spaventa (eds), The European Union and Global 
Emergencies : A Law and Policy Analysis (Hart Publishing 2011).  
26 Matt Watson and Angela Meah, ÔFood, Waste and Safety: Negotiating Conflicting Social Anxieties into 
the Practices of Domestic ProvisioningÕ (2012) 60 The Sociological Review 102. 
27 Emily Broad Leib and others, ÔThe Dating Game: How Confusing Food Date Labels Lead to Food Waste 
in AmericaÕ (NRDC 2013). 
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on food redistribution, rather than a ÔbarrierÕ. Furthermore, best before dates are 
conceptually appropriate in view of the difference of food: food is perishable and subject 
to decay, with implications for human consumption and the value of food.  However, the 
existence of best before dates, alongside a growing fetishising of aesthetic quality over 
nutritional value,28 could undermine the importance and value of food.  This is worthy of 
further research, and consideration in regulatory design. Nonetheless, food lawÕs legal 
line drawing around edibility is conceptually attuned to the importance and difference of 
food.  This is not obviously the case with waste law. 
 Second, the labelling regime distributes responsibility for drawing lines between 
safe/edible and unsafe/inedible food, but arguably gives too much scope to industry. For 
example, whilst a use by date must be used for highly perishable food, beyond that, the 
Regulations do not indicate in what circumstances this label is required; businesses 
largely decide which label to use for particular foods.29  Similarly, whilst some fruit, 
vegetables and bakery products do not require a label, retailers routinely date them.30  The 
regime also leaves calculating time periods largely to industry, with manufacturers and 
retailers adopting large margins of error to safeguard against liability and reputational 
damage.31  The labelling regime thus leaves businesses considerable scope to adopt over-
cautious approaches to labelling that protect from liability and increase profits, whilst 
undermining food waste imperatives. Given this line drawing embodies the resolution of 
trade-offs between commercial interests, food safety and food waste, it may be 
                                               
28 Susanne Freidberg, Fresh: A Perishable History (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2009); 
Joanna Blythman, Shopped: The Shocking Power of British Supermarkets (Harper Perennial 2005).  EU 
marketing standards for fruits and vegetables are similarly criticised: Walter Leal Filho and Marina 
Kovaleva, Food Waste and Sustainable Food Waste Management in the Baltic Sea Region (Springer 2015) 
39. 
29 MacMaolin (n 7) 176; EU Committee (n 10) 42. 
30 Stuart (n 13) ch 4; MacMaolin (n 7) 177Ð9. 
31 Richard Milne, ÔArbiters of Waste: Date Labels, the Consumer and Knowing Good, Safe FoodÕ (2012) 
60 The Sociological Review 84, 91.  
9 
problematic that this is determined by industry.32  In both food and waste law, we should 
pay attention to where legal line drawing, and associated allocations of responsibility, 
support commercial interests at odds with food waste (and other) imperatives, not least 
because those interests feed into the structural causes of food waste.33 
 
3. AD, Redistribution and the Value of Food 
This section outlines the imbalance of support for AD over redistribution, used later in 
the article to explore limitations of waste law.  Incentives for AD which do not distinguish 
between edible and inedible food (or measures which are Ônon-discriminatoryÕ), 
combined with a dearth of measures to support food redistribution, actively remove edible 
food from the food supply chain, and represent a failure to value food as food. 
 
3.1 Measures to support AD 
Food, like other biodegradable material, releases climate change gasses when landfilled.  
The goal of keeping food in the food supply chain must therefore be balanced with 
ensuring that wasted food is kept out of landfill.  AD, where microorganisms break food 
and other bio-waste down to produce biogas/biomethane (for non-intermittent renewable 
heat, electricity and transport) and digestate (solid material which can be used as a 
renewable fertiliser),34 thus has obvious appeal. Diverting food waste from landfill to AD 
also helps the UK comply with a number of legal obligations. Member States must apply 
the waste hierarchy, a priority order at the top of which is waste prevention, followed by 
                                               
32 See Marsden and others (n 7) on challenges arising from the multi-level governance of food. 
33 That retailers drive food waste throughout the supply chain in ways which benefit their bottom line is 
well-documented: Bradshaw (n 11). 
34 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Low Carbon Network Infrastructure (HC 2016-17, 267) 18. 
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preparing for re-use, recycling, (energy) recovery and disposal.35  In the context of food 
waste, the hierarchy is supported by obligations to: divert proportions of biodegradable 
municipal waste from landfill; take Ôappropriate measures to encourageÕ the separate 
collection of bio-waste with a view to composting and digestion; and take necessary 
measures Ôdesigned to achieveÕ an increase in levels of household waste recycling to 50% 
by 2020.36  The Climate Change Act 2008 imposes a binding target to reduce overall UK 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 (based on 1990 levels).  Finally, the UK must 
ensure that renewable energy accounts for 15% of all electricity, heat and transport fuels 
by 2020.37 
 An AD Strategy and Action Plan aims to increase AD capacity as the preferred 
option for ÔresidualÕ food waste; that is, unavoidable or unpreventable food waste (the 
inedible fractions of food) as opposed to edible food surplus or ÔavoidableÕ food waste.38  
It outlines an extensive range of measures to support EnglandÕs AD capacity.  This 
includes scope to legally exempt AD from regulatory waste controls, projects to develop 
markets in digestate, and innovation funding to support AD installations.39  In addition to 
gate fees charged by AD operators for incoming waste,40 AD also receives financial 
support through renewable energy subsidies, including the Renewables Obligation 
                                               
35 WFD (n 8), art 4, discussed further below.  ÔRecyclingÕ means any recovery operation by which waste 
materials are reprocessed into products, materials or substances whether for the original or other purposes;
͒ÔrecoveryÕ involves making use of waste by replacing other materials used for a particular function with 
waste, for example by using waste principally as a fuel to generate energy; ÔdisposalÕ is a non-recovery 
waste disposal operation, such as landfill: ibid, arts 3(11), (15) & (19), and annexes I and II. 
36 Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste [1999] OJ L182/1, art 5; WFD (n 8), arts 
22 and 11(2). Food is a type of biodegradable/bio-waste, and AD of food waste could contribute to the 
household recycling target: DECC and Defra, Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan (Crown 
Copyright 2011) 6. 
37 Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
[2009] OJ L140/16, arts 3(1) & (4) and annex I. 
38 Defra and DECC, Energy from Waste: A Guide to the Debate (Crown Copyright 2014) 14Ð15. AD food 
waste capacity is predicted to rise to 5m tonnes: DECC and Defra (n 36) 19. 
39 Defra, Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan Annual Report 2014 (Crown Copyright 2015); 
DECC and Defra (n 36). 
40 Defra (n 39) 8. 
11 
(RO),41 Feed-in Tariffs (FITs),42 the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI),43 and the 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO).44  However, whilst the stated preference 
is to increase AD capacity for recovering residual waste, renewable energy subsidies do 
not reflect this.45 AD subsidies apply indiscriminately to edible food surplus/avoidable 
food waste (which should be/should have been redistributed) and inedible or unavoidable 
food waste (residual food waste which we may wish to divert to AD).46 The non-
discriminatory nature of subsidies is particularly problematic when combined with the 
dearth of measures to support redistribution (explained below).  Nonetheless, measures 
to support AD means that capacity has grown dramatically, and continues to grow despite 
cuts to FITs.47 
 
3.2 Dearth of measures to support redistribution 
Notwithstanding the potential climate benefits of energy from food waste, redistributing 
food to humans (and animals) is generally more resource efficient than sending it to AD.48  
Furthermore, by keeping food in the food supply chain, redistribution values food as food, 
rather than valuing food as a fuel.  AD (a form of energy recovery), thus sits below food 
                                               
41 The RO closed to new entrants in April 2017 (replaced by Contracts for Difference) but remains open 
until 2037 for existing participants: The Renewables Obligation Order 2015, SI 2015/1947; Renewables 
Obligation Closure Order 2014, SI 2014/2388; The Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier 
Obligations) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2014; Electricity Act 1989 ss 32LC-32LL; DECC, 2010 to 2015 
Government Policy: UK Energy Security (Crown Copyright 2015). 
42 Feed-in Tariff Order 2012, SI 2012/2782; Feed-in Tariff (Amendment) Order 2017, SI 2017/131; Energy 
Act 2008 ss 41Ð3. 
43 The Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations 2011, SI 2011/2860 2011; Energy Act 2008. 
44 Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation Order 2007, SI 2007/3072; Energy Act 2004 s 124. 
45 See RO Order 2015 (n 41); FIT Order 2012 (n 42); FIT Amendment Order 2017 (n 42); RHI Regulations 
2011 (n 43); RTFO Order 2007 (n 44).  
46 Food should not be permitted to deteriorate beyond edibility, so that it can only be handled as food waste 
(digesting avoidable food waste), nor should edible food be treated as waste (digesting edible food). 
47 Anaerobic Digestion & Bioresources Association (ADBA), ÔAnaerobic Digestion Market ReportÕ 
(ABDA 2016) 32; James Parsons, ÔAD FITs Cut despite Industry CriticismÕ (The ENDS Report, 13 February 
2017) <http://www.endsreport.com/article/55457/ad-fits-cut-despite-industry-criticism> accessed 25 
August 2017. 
48 EU Committee (n 10) 48.   
12 
redistribution (Ôre-useÕ, a form of waste prevention) on the waste hierarchy.49  In view of 
this, one might expect policy in this area to match support for AD with similar support 
for food redistribution. This is not the case in England.50  Indeed, redistribution receives 
only limited support, comprising a relatively unambitious voluntary target to double food 
redistribution by 2020,51 together with a food redistribution working group chaired by the 
Waste and Resources Action Programme (WRAP).52 Compared with the range of 
measures to support AD, this softer work on redistribution is underwhelming, and 
includes nothing akin to the legal exemptions or financial incentives supporting AD.   
 Indeed, whilst barriers to increasing redistribution include network development, 
infrastructure requirements and collection logistics, cost is the most significant 
(particularly compared with the costs of digesting food waste).53 A number of 
commentators have thus made calls for financial interventions to Ôlevel the playing fieldÕ, 
including subsidies or loan support, VAT exemptions, or the better publicising of other 
tax relief for donating unsold food.54  Similar to regulatory exemptions for AD, 
interventions and clarifications around food safety liability and date labelling could make 
food redistribution easier. French law has gone further, prohibiting supermarkets from 
                                               
49 WFD (n 8), art 3(13) defines Ôre-useÕ as Ôany operation by which products or components that are not 
waste are used again for the same purpose for which they were conceivedÕ.  AD of food waste performs 
better environmentally than composting, so that recovering rather than recycling food waste is a permissible 
departure from the waste hierarchy: DECC and Defra (n 36) 10Ð11.  
50 Waste is devolved.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider other devolved nations. 
51 With a low baseline of 15,000 tonnes in 2015; cf the GrocerÕs campaign to increase redistribution to 
100,000 tonnes: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1). The redistribution target was 
agreed in January 2017 within the context of the Courtauld Commitment (CC) 2025, a voluntary agreement 
between WRAP (a government-funded not-for-profit company) and 95% of the UK food and drink industry. 
CC 2025 includes a pledge to reduce food and drink waste by 20% by 2025. 
52 WRAP, ÔNew Food Redistribution Industry Working Group Is LaunchedÕ (WRAP, 28 January 2013) 
<http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/new-food-redistribution-industry-working-group-launched> accessed 25 
August 2017. 
53 The cost of redistributing food is approximately £100/tonne (£70 for labour), including the costs of 
keeping food fit for human consumption through segregation, storage and handling: Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1) 21 and written evidence. 
54 FareShare, ÔFareShare Encourages a Level Playing Field for Food DisposalÕ (Fareshare, 8 September 
2015) <http://www.fareshare.org.uk/fareshare-encourages-level-playing-field-for-food-disposal/> 
accessed 25 August 2017; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1). 
13 
throwing away unsold food, and requiring certain retailers to enter into donation 
agreements to redistribute food.55 The 2015-16 Private MemberÕs Food Waste 
(Reduction) Bill included a similar proposal,56 although such measures may be premature 
in England, as compelling donation could swamp the voluntary sector. 
 Nonetheless, despite the range of options available and calls for a level (especially 
financial) playing field, only limited measures support food redistribution. This dearth of 
measures exists despite many redistribution networks operating charitably, and without 
the capacity to cope with demand for surplus food redistribution.57 
 
3.3 The AD/redistribution imbalance: removing food from the food supply chain 
The AD/redistribution imbalance - extensive support for AD, including non-
discriminatory subsidies, combined with limited support for redistribution -  creates an 
alternative to redistribution which incentivises, and actively removes edible food from 
the food supply chain.58  Far from being a Ôpositive solution to food wasteÕ,59 this is a 
gross failure to value food as an important resource.  Additionally, AD subsidies create 
artificial demand for food as a fuel,60 with which an already existing demand for 
redistributed food must then compete. Given the AD infrastructure already developed, its 
feedstock requirements, and increasing dependence on its renewable outputs, this demand 
for Ôfood as fuelÕ will continue for years to come, and beyond the need for AD to be 
subsidised for capacity-development.  Of course, the UK arguably needs some AD 
                                               
55 Angelique Chrisafis, ÔFrench Law Forbids Food Waste by SupermarketsÕ The Guardian (4 February 
2016).  
56 Food Waste (Reduction) Bill 2015-16/67, s 2(1)(e). 
57 Andrew Forsey, ÔAn Evidence Review for the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Hunger in the United 
KingdomÕ (The ChildrenÕs Society 2014) 96Ð7; Alexander and Smaje (n 20). 
58 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1) 21, noted how surplus food that could legally go 
to people was often sent for AD. There was no awareness of the non-discriminatory nature of subsidies. 
59 Defra, Government Review of Waste Policy in England 2011 (PB 13540, Crown Copyright 2011) 9. 
60 As evidenced by the German experience, where crops are grown to feed AD, with implications for food 
prices and the food system broadly: Defra (n 39) 13. 
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capacity for unavoidable food waste, together perhaps with some interim capacity for 
avoidable food waste.  The argument is therefore not Ôredistribution good, AD badÕ.  The 
problem is not subsidies for AD per se.  Rather, the problem is the non-discriminatory 
nature of subsidies coupled with a lack of meaningful support for redistribution.  The 
reduction in tariff levels for AD subsidies61 is thus not necessarily welcome when there 
remains a dearth of measures to support food redistribution and a stock of AD capacity in 
existence.   
 Furthermore, climate change and energy imperatives should not overshadow the 
broader symbolic and distributional consequences here. The AD/redistribution imbalance 
amounts to a codified preference for profitable waste management (AD) over charitable 
waste prevention (food redistribution), which favours commercial interests over the 
interests of the hungry.62  Embedded within the AD/redistribution imbalance are as yet 
unacknowledged distributional consequences; consequences rendered more profound in 
the context of foodÕs importance as a resource. This is not to suggest that food donation 
is the solution to food poverty. Clearly, surplus food cannot easily and always be fed to 
the hungry. Furthermore, responses to food poverty may more appropriately reside within 
the welfare state, as opposed to donating to impoverished sections of society what 
culturally might be considered ÔwasteÕ. However, the connections between food 
abundance, food waste and food poverty are real,63 and that abundance is imbued with an 
economic agenda somewhat divorced from the intrinsic value of food and its importance 
as a resource.64  As will be argued, rather than helping to unpack this problematic 
                                               
61 Parsons (n 47). 
62 AD need not be profitable, nor redistribution charitable, but this is the current model. 
63 Evans (n 5); Bloom (n 6); Stuart (n 13). 
64 Marie Mourad, ÔRecycling, Recovering and Preventing ÒFood WasteÓ: Competing Solutions for Food 
Systems Sustainability in the United States and FranceÕ (2016) 126 Journal of Cleaner Production 461; 
Martin OÕBrien, ÔA ÒLasting TransformationÓ of Capitalist Surplus: From Food Stocks to FeedstocksÕ 
(2012) 60 The Sociological Review 192. 
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AD/redistribution imbalance and its broader consequences, waste law is part of the 
problem.   
 
4. The Role of Waste Law 
This section explores how waste lawÕs key architecture applies to food, and how this 
squares with structural causes of food waste.  By examining waste lawÕs role in framing, 
validating and underpinning the AD/redistribution imbalance, it shows how, rather than 
providing the legal and analytical tools to address food waste, waste law is actually part 
of the problem.  These problems are a familiar story within waste law, but exacerbated by 
foodÕs importance and difference as a resource.  
 Before exploring the waste hierarchy, the definition of waste, and the structural 
work done by this key architecture, it is worth outlining the aims of waste law: waste 
management and waste prevention.65  Waste management is the collection, transport and 
treatment of waste, together with the after-care of waste sites.66 EU law requires Member 
States to regulate those who produce, hold, transport, broker and treat waste for 
commercial purposes.67  In the UK, this includes permitting, registration, inspection, and 
record-keeping requirements, together with a waste duty of care.68 Waste prevention, by 
contrast, concerns measures taken before a substance, material or product has become 
waste that reduce the quantity of waste or the adverse impacts of waste generation.69  
Waste prevention acknowledges that the presence of waste itself can indicate a failure to 
use resources effectively.  It can imply radical adjustments to the structure of societies, 
                                               
65 Mapped in the two waste planning obligations, the waste management plan and the waste prevention 
programme, WFD (n 8), arts 28 and 29. 
66 ibid, art 3(9).  Waste treatment is the recovery or disposal of waste, ibid, art 3(14). 
67 WFD (n 8), chs III-IV. 
68 See Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (9th edn, OUP 2017) ch 18. 
69 Prevention also includes measures that reduce the content of harmful substances in materials/products, 
WFD (n 8), art 3(12). 
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such as limiting consumption, but also less radical interventions like extending the life of 
resources through reuse and repair.70  Unlike waste management, concerned with what 
we do with ÔstuffÕ once it becomes waste, waste prevention prevents that stuff from 
becoming waste in the first place. 
 
4.1 The Waste Hierarchy 
 Waste management and prevention feature in the centrepiece of waste law, the waste 
hierarchy, with prevention at the top, and numerous waste management options at the 
bottom.  However, government deploys the hierarchy to legally validate, rather than 
condemn, the AD/redistribution imbalance. This distracts from meaningful engagement 
with food waste prevention, and exemplifies the hierarchyÕs limited legal and analytical 
utility. The hierarchy, together with an economic agenda it underpins, fail to 
accommodate foodÕs special status, and are at odds with structural causes of food waste. 
 Member States, and those subject to waste obligations, are legally required to apply 
the waste hierarchy.71 Arguably, sending surplus food to AD, rather than redistributing it, 
fails to comply with that legal obligation, given AD sits below redistribution on the 
hierarchy.  However, waste holders are required to take all ÔreasonableÕ measures to apply 
the waste hierarchy, taking into account technical feasibility and economic viability.72  
Given the problematic incentive structure created by the AD/redistribution imbalance, 
sending food to AD may be ÔreasonableÕ.  But the manner of implementation does not 
help, with waste holders demonstrating compliance with the hierarchy by ticking the 
                                               
70 Johan Hultman and Herv Corvellec, ÔThe European Waste Hierarchy: From the Sociomateriality of 
Waste to a Politics of ConsumptionÕ (2012) 44 Environment and Planning A 2413. 
71 WFD (n 8), art 4; Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/988, reg 12. 
72 Waste Regulations 2011 (n 71), reg 12. 
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relevant box on Ôwritten informationÕ provided when transferring waste.73  Neither the 
Environment Agency nor government more widely has shown much appetite for 
enforcing the hierarchy in this context, to the dismay of the House of CommonsÕ 
Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs Committee.74  However, it is not clear what 
meaningful enforcement might look like. 
 By targeting interventions at AD over redistribution, one could argue that the 
AD/redistribution imbalance itself represents Member State non-compliance with the 
hierarchy.  As campaigners have argued, Ôwe have a waste hierarchy that is completely 
out of kilter with the economic hierarchy that sits alongside itÕ.75  However, the waste 
hierarchy operates as a Ôpriority orderÕ.76  Failing to specify when an option at the top of 
the hierarchy is exhausted leaves considerable scope for avoiding hierarchy obligations.77 
Furthermore, whilst Member States may depart from the hierarchy for life-cycle reasons, 
and must take into account technical feasibility and economic viability,78 government 
does not attempt to justify the AD/redistribution imbalance on any of those relevant bases. 
Brought together, this raises questions about the hierarchyÕs legal utility, especially if 
Ôimportant voter concerns like costsÕ can invalidate it.79  Ludwig Krmer thus 
characterises the hierarchy as a policy recommendation, describing legal action against 
Member States for not respecting the hierarchy as ÔunthinkableÕ.80 
                                               
73 Formerly waste transfer notes, ibid reg 35(2)(d); The Waste (England and Wales) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2014, SI 2014/656, reg 6; Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford, Environmental 
Law: Text, Cases & Materials (OUP 2013) 704. 
74 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (n 1) 7Ð8 & 21Ð22. 
75 EU Committee (n 10) 46. 
76 WFD (n 8), art 4(1). 
77 S Van Ewijk and JA Stegemann, ÔLimitations of the Waste Hierarchy for Achieving Absolute Reductions 
in Material ThroughputÕ (2016) 132 Journal of Cleaner Production 122.  
78 WFD (n 8), art 4(2). 
79 Van Ewijk and Stegemann (n 77) 126. 
80 Ludwig Krmer, EU Environmental Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 361. 
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 Ironically, however, government deploys the hierarchy to legitimatise rather than 
condemn support for AD as a less bad alternative to landfill.81 This misuses the hierarchy, 
by comparing AD only with other waste management options and ignoring prevention. 
Nonetheless, the very inclusion of an option on the hierarchy legitimises that option, and 
the comparative preference of AD over landfill is a narrative that the hierarchy tends to 
facilitate, at least in common parlance and as a result of its limited enforceability. Whilst 
the legal imperative is to prioritise prevention, the practical imperative is to Ômove upÕ 
the hierarchy: devoting considerable resource and effort to move up the hierarchy, only a 
little, from landfill to energy recovery (addressing what we do with food once it becomes 
waste), as opposed to a more fundamental shift to the top priority of prevention (seeking 
to stop food from becoming waste in the first place). As a heuristic, the hierarchy tells us 
not whether the option adopted is Ôgood or badÕ per se, simply whether options are 
relatively better or worse: diverting food waste from landfill to AD is Ôrelatively goodÕ, 
whereas food redistribution is Ôrelatively betterÕ.82  This undermines the hierarchyÕs utility 
as an analytical and legal tool in addressing food waste: the centrepiece of waste law is 
deployed to provide legal validation to a policy landscape that fails to value food, but 
which, as only problematically enforceable (if at all), is seemingly beyond legal control. 
 Used this way, the hierarchy becomes the waste management hierarchy, 
representing broader conceptual problems with prevention in waste law.83 Energy from 
waste policy documents setting out the principles for AD and food waste focus on the 
bottom of the hierarchy, particularly with a fixation on recycling efforts (as opposed to 
prevention) when moving up the hierarchy.84 The legal obligation to prioritise prevention 
                                               
81 See especially Defra (n 39) 6. 
82 Van Ewijk and Stegemann (n 77). 
83 Eloise Scotford, ÔTrash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste RegulationÕ (2007) 19 Journal of 
Environmental Law 367. 
84 See, for example, Defra and DECC (n 36) paras 58, 213, 228 & 295. 
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is lost in this shift towards waste management, a side effect of which is a failure to engage 
with food waste prevention. For example, the aim of Ômanaging discarded resources back 
into the economyÕ85 is a glib assertion that ignores bigger questions of whether those 
resources should have been discarded or wasted at all.  In turn, this distracts from ensuring 
that energy from waste does not undermine waste prevention: the AD Strategy pays no 
attention whatsoever to the relationship between AD subsidies and food redistribution. 
This frames food waste as a waste management problem, rather than a resource 
management problem, which in turn fails to engage with the structural causes of food 
waste around how, as a society, we value and manage food.  Indeed, as others have argued 
with respect to the waste hierarchy generally, given that waste prevention concerns what 
we do with ÔstuffÕ before it becomes waste, waste prevention actually has little to do with 
waste, so that in turn waste law has a limited role in preventing waste.86  That critique of 
waste law and the waste hierarchy exposes a limitation in addressing structural causes of 
food waste, because behaviour that gives rise to food waste is not necessarily waste-
related.87 This suggests a conceptual and inherent limitation within waste law to address 
the causes of food waste. 
 This lack of engagement further up the food waste hierarchy fits with shifts from 
seeing waste as a problem, to seeing waste as a resource, and even an economic 
opportunity.88 The waste hierarchy has been central to this shift, particularly by 
emphasising and legitimising recycling and recovery.  As outputs with economic value 
(transforming waste into a resource), recycling and recovery processes work within 
                                               
85 ibid 213. 
86 Eloise Scotford, ÔThe New Waste Directive - Trying to Do It All...an Early AssessmentÕ (2009) 11 
Environmental Law Review 75. 
87 Evans (n 5) 95. 
88 EU Commission, ÔClosing the Loop - An EU Action Plan for the Circular EconomyÕ (Communication) 
COM (2015) 614 final, 2 December 2015; Nicky Gregson and others, ÔInterrogating the Circular Economy: 
The Moral Economy of Resource Recovery in the EUÕ (2015) 44 Economy and Society 218. 
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prevailing norms of economic growth.89 When waste becomes a resource, it also becomes 
unproblematic, or less problematic: framing waste as a resource Ôis an answer to the 
question of waste as a problem É so, in a way, the more waste, the betterÕ.90  However, 
turning waste into a resource works against waste prevention and redistribution, which, 
with a decrease of outputs with economic value, are qualitatively different from 
recovery.91  AD produces biogas and digestate, outputs with capital value, so that food 
waste becomes a resource, and un- (or less) problematic.  In contrast, food redistribution 
produces nothing (or very little) of economic value.92 
 The AD/redistribution imbalance thus fits within, is even explained by a broader 
agenda seeking to construct waste as a resource; an agenda to which the waste hierarchy 
is central, and provides legal validation. It should thus come as no surprise that 
interventions in this area prefer capital-intensive methods of waste management to 
charitable methods of waste prevention. We might be comfortable with this for resources 
not distinguished in their significance by basic human need. But the preference for 
economic value (AD) over non-value (redistribution) looks unpalatable in the context of 
a resource as important as food.  By failing to value food as food, this agenda is also at 
odds with the structural causes of food waste. The limited practical and legal utility of 
waste hierarchy, together with the Ôwaste as a resourceÕ approach it validates, adds to 
problems surrounding food waste, rather than providing tools to disrupt them. 
 
                                               
89 Hultman and Corvellec (n 70) 2415; Marie Mourad, ÔThinking Outside the Bin: Is There a Better Way to 
Fight ÒFood Waste?ÓÕ (2015) 59 Berkeley Journal of Sociology (Environment & Society) 
<http://berkeleyjournal.org/2015/11/thinking-outside-the-bin-is-there-a-better-way-to-fight-food-waste/> 
accessed 9 April 2018. 
90 Hultman and Corvellec (n 70) 2420 & 2417. 
91 Nicky Gregson and Mike Crang, ÔMateriality and Waste: Inorganic Vitality in a Networked WorldÕ (2010) 
42 Environment and Planning A 1026; Zsuzsa Gille, ÔActor Networks, Modes of Production, and Waste 
Regimes: Reassembling the Macro-SocialÕ (2010) 42 Environment and Planning A 1049. 
92 Perhaps savings from fewer hungry people. 
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4.2 The Definition of Waste 
The limitations of waste law are also exemplified by the role which the legal definition 
of waste plays in the AD/redistribution imbalance. The holder-specific definition of waste 
applied to food is over inclusive, capable of labelling perfectly edible food as ÔwasteÕ. 
Whilst this is not a problem unique to food, no consideration has been given to whether 
the definitionÕs regulatory logic applies to a resource as important as food. There are two 
concrete albeit narrow legal problems flowing from this in the context of AD and 
redistribution, where the definition of waste underpins non-discriminatory AD subsidies 
whilst also acting as barrier to redistribution.  More broadly, the over inclusive definition 
of waste is uniquely powerful in reflecting and reinforcing how as a society we value 
food. With the central operative concept in waste law ill attuned to the special status of 
food, we should query whether generalised waste law is the appropriate home for food 
waste. 
 
4.2.1 Waste lawÕs regulatory logic: ÔfoodÕ ÔwasteÕ 
 The legal definition of waste is over inclusive, and underpinned by a regulatory 
logic not obviously conceptually appropriate in the context of food. There is no 
commonly accepted definition of Ôfood wasteÕ.93  Instead, the definition of waste applies 
indiscriminately to food, so that we have only a composite legal definition by applying 
the definition of ÔwasteÕ to the definition of ÔfoodÕ.  ÔFoodÕ ÔwasteÕ is thus any substance, 
object or product intended or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans (food),94 
which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard (waste).95  There is some 
disagreement in the literature as to whether the definition of waste is ÔsubjectiveÕ, owing 
                                               
93 EU Committee (n 10) 11Ð14. 
94 General Food Law (n 7), art 2. 
95 WFD (n 8), art 3(1). 
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to the centrality of the holderÕs intentions,96 or Ôaction-basedÕ, given the significance of 
the verb ÔdiscardÕ.97  Either way, the definition of waste is holder-specific. The potential 
economic or other value in a particular substance/object is irrelevant to the legal question 
of whether something is waste.98  Furthermore, given the definition turns on whether any 
substance/object is discarded, the definition of waste is not substance-based.99  The 
objective characteristics of a substance are irrelevant to the legal question of whether 
something is waste.100 
 Underpinning the holder-specific definition of waste is a logic derived from a 
conceptualisation of the problem posed by waste specifically, distinct from pollution 
generally.101  From a waste management perspective, the harm of waste is the potential 
for pollution that arises when a holder no longer has any use for an object, nor perceives 
any value in it.  When the self-interest to handle an item with care is removed, an inherent 
probability arises that the item will be dumped, or treated unsafely.  Regulatory 
obligations attaching to ÔwasteÕ kick in when that risk arises: at the point of intended, 
required or actual discard. The holder-specific point of discard also allocates initial 
responsibility for safe waste treatment: whoever ÔproducesÕ waste, or is in possession of 
an object when it becomes waste,102 must ensure that waste is safely handled and treated. 
Driven by a regulatory logic concerned with safe waste management, the holder-specific 
definition of waste thus (i) draws a legal line between waste and non-waste, and (ii) 
allocates initial legal responsibility for waste treatment. 
                                               
96 Ilona Cheyne and Michael Purdue, ÔFitting Definition to Purpose: The Search for a Satisfactory 
Definition of WasteÕ (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 149; Ilona Cheyne, ÔThe Definition of Waste 
in EC LawÕ (2002) 14 Journal of Environmental Law 61. 
97 Scotford (n 83). 
98 Krmer (n 80) 371. 
99 Scotford (n 83) 375. 
100 Joined Cases C-418/97 & 419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland v Minister Van Volkshuisvesting [2000] 
ECR I-4475. 
101 David Wilkinson, ÔTime to Discard the Concept of Waste?Õ (1999) 1 Environmental Law Review 172. 
102 WFD (n 8), art 3(4). This may entail ensuring wasteÕs safe handling or treatment by another party.  
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 From a resource management perspective, however, the harm at the point of discard 
has already occurred: resources have been used, and squandered if not used effectively.  
In order to value food as food, edibility is a (if not the) key touchstone in determining 
when food is acceptably removed from the food supply chain. From a waste 
prevention/resource management perspective, only inedible food should thus be labelled 
as ÔwasteÕ (unavoidable/residual food waste). Instead, the legal definition of waste ignores 
foodÕs edibility unless the holder is minded to seek re-use opportunities. Otherwise, ÔfoodÕ 
becomes ÔwasteÕ at the point of discard, irrespective of whether that food is still (or once 
was) edible. From a resource management perspective, the definition of waste tells us 
little about whether food ought to be waste.  By leaving wasting food unquestioned,103 
the central operative concept within waste law does limited analytical work. 
 This exposes how the definition of waste embodies a conceptual tension within 
waste law between waste management and waste prevention/resource management.104  
Once material is labelled as ÔwasteÕ, it is necessarily managed rather than prevented, and 
can subject beneficial activities (such as recycling and recovery) to the costly regulatory 
and stigma burdens attaching to ÔwasteÕ in ways which dis-incentivise waste reduction.105 
Despite the legal priority given to prevention, the definition of waste naturally lends itself 
to end-of-pipe approaches to waste, often missing opportunities higher up the 
hierarchy.106  These problems are not unique to food.  However, little (if any) work has 
been done to consider whether this regulatory logic applies with the same force to food. 
                                               
103 Van Ewijk and Stegemann (n 77) 125. 
104 Scotford (n 83); Robert Lee and Elen Stokes, ÔRehabilitating the Definition of Waste: Is It Fully 
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105 Seen especially in by-products litigation.  For a full account, and in addition to articles cited above, see 
Fisher, Lange and Scotford (n 73) ch 16. See also Stephen Tromans, ÔEC Waste LawÑA Complete Mess?Õ 
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106 Harriet Bulkeley and Kye Askins, ÔWaste Interfaces: Biodegradable Waste, Municipal Policy and 
Everyday PracticeÕ (2009) 175 Geographical Journal 251. 
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There is value (how much?) in seeking to prevent harm arising from inappropriate food 
waste management.  However, if, for reasons of waste management, edibility should not 
solely determine when food becomes waste, it does not follow that edibility should be 
entirely irrelevant. There should be overt deliberation on how to balance food waste 
management risks with the goal of keeping such an important resource in the food supply 
chain. The over inclusive definition of waste is not attuned to this, and with a composite 
definition of ÔfoodÕ ÔwasteÕ, waste law overrides the conceptually appropriate line 
drawing of food law, and fails to accommodate the special status of food as a resource. 
  
4.2.2 Narrower problems: AD and food redistribution 
 The over inclusive definition of waste is more than a ÔmereÕ conceptual problem 
operating at an abstract level.  Two narrow but concrete legal problems flow from the use 
and operation of the holder-specific definition of waste in the context of AD and 
redistribution, helping us to better understand the limitations of waste law in addressing 
food waste.   
 The first problem concerns the definitionÕs inappropriate line-drawing role in 
underpinning subsidies for AD.  AD policy discussion features mainly in the context of 
energy from waste, which is naturally waste management-driven.  However, this 
management-centricity is satisfactory only if the starting principleÑto encourage energy 
from residual wasteÑis followed through in implementation. Otherwise, this fails to give 
priority to prevention. Subsidies do not make this distinction, available indiscriminately 
for edible food/avoidable food waste and inedible food/unavoidable food waste.  Making 
such a distinction might seem like regulatory overkill, but whilst the receipt of renewable 
energy subsidies for certain installations is subject to exacting sustainability criteria, these 
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criteria do not apply in the context of food waste: energy from ÔwasteÕ (over inclusively 
defined, as above) is exempt from these criteria, and thus deemed ÔsustainableÕ.107   
 The regulatory logic of the holder-specific definition of waste, concerned with when 
waste obligations apply, is very different from the logic which ought to underpin the 
award of subsidies for energy from waste.  The AD Strategy seeks to support the 
development of energy from residual waste, not all waste, and so subsidies ought to be 
discriminatory.  The different purposes that the definition of waste might serve (here, 
regulatory versus fiscal) are not acknowledged, and the regulatory logic inappropriately 
prevails. In this context, the line drawing is conceptually inappropriate.  Of course, there 
are limits to the goals that specific sectors of environmental law can conceivably achieve. 
The renewables regime is perhaps rightly unconcerned with waste prevention, but only 
because it relies on waste law to do analytical work which, as above, it is presently 
incapable of doing.  Instead, the definition of waste not only underpins, but in view of the 
uniquely powerful role of legal categorisation,108 legitimises the incentivised removal of 
edible food from the food supply chain. This is especially problematic in the context of a 
resource as important as food, and at odds with structural accounts of food waste: waste 
law underpins and legitimises a failure to value food as food. 
 The second problem with the definition of waste exposed by exploring AD and 
redistribution concerns indirect barriers to food redistribution created by the definition of 
wasteÕs allocative role. Donating food for redistribution (Ôre-useÕ) is not an act of 
                                               
107 These sustainability criteria are concerned with land use and greenhouse gas savings RO Order 2015 (n 
41); Ofgem, ÔRenewables Obligation: Sustainability Criteria (Guidance)Õ (Ofgem 2016) 10Ð16, 85; FIT 
Amendment Order 2017 (n 42); Ofgem, ÔFeed-in Tariffs: Guidance on Sustainability Criteria and Feedstock 
RestrictionsÕ (Ofgem 2017) 9Ð10 & 66; RHI Regulations 2011 (n 43); Ofgem, ÔNon-Domestic RHI 
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Order 2007 (n 44); Department for Transport, ÔRTFO Guidance Part Two: Carbon and Sustainability 
GuidanceÕ (Crown Copyright 2014). 
108 Discussed below. 
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discarding caught by the definition of waste,109 so that waste law directly protects the 
redistribution of surplus food. The definitionÕs line-drawing role is not problematic here 
in the way it had been in the circumstances surrounding litigation on by-products, where 
the over-inclusive definition of waste constituted a barrier to better use.110 However, the 
holder-specific definition of waste allocates initial legal responsibility for waste treatment 
to the first waste holder, i.e. whoever is in possession at the point of discard.  This 
inevitably allocates initial responsibility to food redistribution organisations for disposing 
of any unused surplus food accepted from retailers.  This then creates disincentives to 
accept that food in the first place.  As explained by Alexander and Smaje, the perishability 
of food particularly increases the risk of being responsible for unused surplus, so that the 
disincentive to accept perishable food is greater.111 The holder-specific definition of 
wasteÕs allocation of responsibility can thus act a barrier to food redistribution, rather than 
an obviously conceptually appropriate limitation. The problem is exacerbated by foodÕs 
perishability (and waste lawÕs failure to accommodate that objective characteristic), and 
adds to the AD/redistribution imbalance. 
 Furthermore, the definition of waste allocates waste obligations irrespective of the 
relative responsibilities for generating that waste. In the case of unused donated surplus, 
this releases retailers from the responsibility for disposing of food waste which they are 
structurally complicit in causing.112  By not spreading responsibility for the disposal of 
food waste across the food supply chain, the holder-specific definition of waste is at odds 
with structural causes of food waste. Furthermore, as is a continual theme, with charitable 
                                               
109 WFD (n 8), art 3(13). 
110 Fisher, Lange and Scotford (n 73) ch 16. 
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rather than for-profit models of food redistribution, this allocation of responsibility 
inevitably benefits commercial interests at the expense of food waste imperatives, for the 
reasons explained above. 
 
4.2.3 Legal definitions matter 
Arguably, these two narrower problems arise not from an inherent problem with 
the definition of waste itself, but from its inappropriate use in other regulatory regimes 
(renewables subsidies), or the legal consequences flowing from definition (initial 
responsibility for waste treatment). However, the conceptual problems with the definition 
of waste of applied to food (outlined above) are rendered more broadly problematic when 
squared with the structural causes of food waste. 
 The definition of waste has inescapably normative implications.113  This process of 
categorisation is inherently value-laden, partly because waste can have positive and 
negative value.  This is central to Michael ThompsonÕs conceptualisation of waste as a 
Ôregion of flexibilityÕ with scope for varied resource valuation.114 This region of flexibility 
is central to understanding how perceptions of value are not only complex and contingent, 
but malleable.  It follows that categorising food as waste is not a value free or apolitical 
exercise.115  As we have seen, lines between edible food surplus and inedible food waste 
are subject to vested economic/commercial interests with distributional consequences. 
Alongside this, a rich body of scholarship on waste documents how the process of 
labelling things as waste is part of a wider system of resource valuation.116 The process 
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of categorisating and defining food waste is thus a profound manifestation of how a 
society values food: waste is Ôboth expressive of social values and sustaining to themÕ.117   
 We should thus be cognisant of the way that law, by intervening in that region of 
flexibility, reflects and scaffolds broader structural failures to value food.  That waste can 
have positive and negative value also underpins the regulatory logic of a holder-specific 
legal definition.  However, assessing the definition only in terms of its narrower 
regulatory function ignores the broader, uniquely powerful symbolic and structural work 
that legal categorisation does.118 Given that rich waste scholarship, it is unhelpful that the 
definition of waste tells us little about whether food waste is legitimately ÔwasteÕ.  The 
limited analytical work done by the legal definition provides little assistance in navigating 
or unpacking the structural challenges surrounding food waste. 
  
4.3 Alternatives to the deeper embedding of structurally problematic concepts 
The problems highlighted with the key architecture of waste law exposed by the 
AD/redistribution imbalance are more than isolated regulatory problems Ôof the momentÕ. 
Law is complicit in the structural causes of food waste: legal norms can become 
embedded, so that law, and not just the contemporary regulatory landscape, makes the 
structural causes of food waste more difficult to disrupt. The is reflected in the central 
role retained for the waste hierarchy and the definition of waste within forthcoming EU 
legislation on food waste.119 While detailed discussion of only provisionally agreed 
legislation is beyond the scope of this article, two brief points might be made regarding 
                                               
117 Gregson and Crang (n 91) 1027. 
118 Anna Krzywoszynska, ÔÒWaste? You Mean by-Products!Ó From Bio-Waste Management to Agro-
Ecology in Italian Winemaking and BeyondÕ (2012) 60 The Sociological Review 47. 
119 European Parliament, ÔProposal for a Directive Amending Directive 2008/98/EC on Waste: Provisional 
Agreement of 23 February 2018 Resulting from Interinstitutional NegotiationsÕ PE618.285. 
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revisions to the WFD which in turn raise broader questions as to whether waste law is the 
appropriate legal home for food waste. 
 First, under the provisionally agreed revised WFD, the waste hierarchy remains 
central to a range of specific food waste obligations placed on Member States. This 
includes to make use of economic instruments to incentivise compliance with the waste 
hierarchy, Ôsuch asÕ fiscal incentives for food donation,120 take measures to reduce food 
waste across the supply chain Ôas a contributionÕ to UN Sustainable Development 
Goals,121 and ÔencourageÕ food donation and other redistribution, prioritising human use 
over reprocessing into non-food products.122  Whether any of these obligations are strong 
enough to condemn the AD/redistribution imbalance is unclear, particularly in view of 
the use of softer language (Ôsuch asÕ, Ômaking a contributionÕ and ÔencouragingÕ). 
Furthermore, economic incentives for food waste donation are neither necessary under 
the proposed text,123 nor likely (alone) to be sufficient.124  Most fundamentally, while 
prioritising the human use of food recognises the perversity of diverting edible food to 
AD, framing the AD v. redistribution debate by reference to the waste hierarchy, 
seemingly masks more fundamental questions as to whether we should be producing the 
quantities of food, in the way and places that we do, that the AD or redistribution of food 
surplus is even necessary.   
                                               
120 ibid, art 1(3) and Annex IVa(3). 
121 ibid, art 1(9).  The UN Sustainable Development Goals include a target which calls for halving per capita 
global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reducing food losses along production and supply 
chains by 2030.  
122 ibid art 1(9). Food waste prevention measures are to be supported by the adoption of a specific food 
waste prevention programme: ibid art 1(17). 
123 They are one example of the economic instruments / other measures which may be used under the harder 
obligation to apply economic instruments to incentivise the waste hierarchy. 
124 As I have argued elsewhere, economic/market approaches to food waste will not be without problems, 
see ÔFood Waste NarrativesÕ (in progress/forthcoming) and Bradshaw (n 11). 
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 Second, the provisional agreement to adopt the type of composite definition of 
ÔfoodÕ ÔwasteÕ explored above,125 means that the definition of waste remains holder-
specific, thus capturing edible food and avoidable food waste. This is sensible for a 
common reporting methodology (such food has been ÔwastedÕ).126 However, it fails to 
address: the inherent conceptual problems with an over-inclusive definition of waste 
which are not unassailably justified, in the context of food, by waste management 
regulatory logic; the narrow legal problems with the definition underpinning AD 
subsidies whilst indirectly dis-incentivising redistribution; and the broader structural 
problems of a legal definition which leaves the act of wasting unquestioned. 
 If food wasteÕs home is to remain within waste law, the starting point in addressing 
these challenges must be within the key architecture and normative touchstones of waste 
law itself, arguably starting with definitions.127 This is not only because so much hinges 
upon the definition of waste, including the entirety of waste law, the implementation of 
waste policy, and an underpinning role in other regulatory regimes. It is also because legal 
categorisation reflects and shapes structural valuations of food. In light of foodÕs 
importance and difference as a resource, there may be a case for special regulatory 
treatment within waste law.  This might involve granularity in the definition of waste 
when applied to food, and/or an entirely separate prevention regime for food waste, such 
as extended producer responsibility (EPR).128 
                                               
125 Where the legal definition of ÔwasteÕ is applied to the legal definition of ÔfoodÕ, see European Parliament 
(n 119), art 1(2)(d). 
126 On measurement definitions, see Food Loss and Waste Protocol Steering Committee, ÔFood Loss and 
Waste Accounting and Reporting StandardÕ (World Resources Institute 2016). 
127 Such as value-based conceptions of waste, under which it as inappropriate to classify as ÔwasteÕ items 
which have value to another, eg David Pocklington, ÔOpening PandoraÕs Box - the EU Review of the 
Definition of ÒWasteÓÕ [2003] European Environmental Law Review 205. 
128 On EPR for other waste streams, see Fisher, Lange and Scotford (n 73) 710Ð1. 
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 At the same time, the provisionally agreed WFD forms part of a broader ÔcircularÕ 
economy package.129 The idea of the circular economy involves recovering valuable 
resources back into the economy, rather than simply making and disposing of products in 
a ÔlinearÕ fashion. This economic agenda is behind the problematic shift to seeing waste 
as a resource, capturing the imagination of policy makers and waste professionals to such 
an extent that seeing Ôwaste as a resourceÕ is now conventional wisdom.130 With the waste 
hierarchy and the definition of waste underpinning that apparent wisdom, the key 
architecture of waste law is central to a deeper embedding of structural failures to value 
food, compounding rather disrupting the problem of food waste.  
 The limited analytical and conceptual utility of both the definition of waste and the 
waste hierarchy raises questions as to whether waste law is the appropriate home for food 
waste.  A comparison here with food law is apposite. Whilst food law is not concerned 
with resource management, it does accommodate the importance and difference of food 
by drawing conceptually appropriate lines between food and non-food by reference to 
edibility, the key determinant of foodÕs resource value as food. Leveraging food law for 
food waste thus warrants examination. Either way, at present, waste law fails to provide 
the analytical and legal tools appropriate for framing and underpinning food waste 
interventions. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
                                               
129 EU Commission (n 88). 
130 Alan Murray, Keith Skene and Kathryn Haynes, ÔThe Circular Economy: An Interdisciplinary 
Exploration of the Concept and Application in a Global ContextÕ (2017) 140 Journal of Business Ethics 
369; Gregson and others (n 88). 
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This article identifies problems with the key architecture of waste law applied to food, a 
resource worthy of special status. The waste hierarchy and the definition of waste frame, 
underpin and provide legal validation to a problematic imbalance of support for AD over 
the redistribution of food. The combined the effect of this imbalance is the incentivised 
removal of edible food from the food supply chain. It is thus important to query whether 
waste law, by reflecting and scaffolding a failure to value food as food, adds to the 
structural causes of food waste, rather than providing tools to address it. 
 Indeed, the waste hierarchy and the definition of waste have been powerfully 
complicit in narrowing food waste (and indeed, other waste problems) into an end-point 
problem of waste management, rather than an upstream problem of resource 
management. This is at odds with structural accounts of food waste, and distracts from 
proper engagement with underlying problems of how, as a society, we value food. For 
example, framing the AD v. redistribution debate by reference to the waste hierarchy 
masks more fundamental questions as to whether we should be producing the quantities 
of food, in the way and places that we do, that the AD or redistribution of food surplus is 
even necessary.  Debates framed by the waste hierarchy distract from bigger systematic 
failures within our food system.  De-problematising food waste by recasting it as a 
resource similarly renders waste law limited as a framework for addressing food waste. 
 Furthermore, narrowing food waste into a downstream waste management problem 
creates a legally constructed policy space ripe for blaming those at the end of the supply 
chain: it becomes easier, even legally legitimate, to blame consumers for food waste in 
ways which research has already told us is inaccurate and ineffectual.  Meanwhile, the 
legal lines drawn and shaped by law between edible surplus and inedible waste, together 
with associated allocations of responsibility, support vested commercial interests over the 
imperatives of food waste reduction and the interests of the hungry. Unless we have 
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proper conversations about food as a resource (and a legal framework enabling this), 
rather than just a conversation about food waste, it will be difficult to offer meaningful 
interventions. 
 In some ways, this is a familiar story within waste law.  However, in the context of 
foodÕs importance and difference as a resource, this struggle becomes profound and 
urgent: food wasteÕs special status exacerbates waste lawÕs problems. Full consideration 
of responses to these problems is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, food waste 
arguably warrants special regulatory treatment. Either within or outwith waste law, law 
should do more to interfere with the framing and legitimation of food waste as a waste 
management problem.  Within waste law, this might include an EPR regime, but 
challenges will inevitably remain, including whether waste law can meaningfully address 
the challenges of waste management, waste prevention and resource management 
simultaneously, to provide conceptually appropriate tools for unpacking the structural 
causes of food waste.  It may be that a body of law concerned with waste is inherently 
incapable of meaningful concern for resources. An alternative regulatory home may be 
apposite, perhaps by making space for waste in food law. 
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